susie's earlier post provides some clues but she didn't provide the critical details.
susie can you elaborate on the source of the survey?
it was research done by dr.poulin i believe, it was part of the crown's expert testimony submitted in defense of the ontario charter challenge.
in her decision she explains that the testimony of the abolitionist "experts" does not meet the critieria set down by the government of canada to qualify the statements as exceptable to the court; i quote;
[352] I find that some of the evidence tendered on this application did not meet the standards set by Canadian courts for the admission of expert evidence. The parties did not challenge the admissibility of evidence tendered but asked the court to afford little weight to the evidence of
the other party.
[353] I found the evidence of Dr. Melissa Farley to be problematic. Although Dr. Farley has conducted a great deal of research on prostitution, her advocacy appears to have permeated her opinions. For example, Dr. Farley's unqualified assertion in her affidavit that prostitution is inherently violent appears to contradict her own findings that prostitutes who work from indoor locations generally experience less violence. Furthermore, in her affidavit, she failed to qualify her opinion regarding the causal relationship between post-traumatic stress disorder and prostitution, namely that it could be caused by events unrelated to prostitution.
[354] Dr. Farley's choice of language is at times inflammatory and detracts from her conclusions. For example, comments such as, "prostitution is to the community what incest is to the family," and "just as pedophiles justify sexual assault of children....men who use prostitutes develop elaborate cognitive schemes to justify purchase and use of women" make her opinions less persuasive.
[355] Dr. Farley stated during cross-examination that some of her opinions on prostitution were formed prior to her research, including, "that prostitution is a terrible harm to women, that prostitution is abusive in its very nature, and that prostitution amounts to men paying a woman for the right to rape her."
[356] Accordingly, for these reasons, I assign less weight to Dr. Farley's evidence.
[357] Similarly, I find that Drs. Raymond and Poulin were more like advocates than experts offering independent opinions to the court. At times, they made bold, sweeping statements that were not reflected in their research. For example, some of Dr. Raymond's statements on prostitutes were based on her research on trafficked women.
As well, during cross-examination, it was revealed that some of Dr. Poulin's citations for his claim that the average age of recruitment into prostitution is 14 years old were misleading or incorrect. In his affidavit, Dr. Poulin suggested that there have been instances of serial killers targeting prostitutes who worked at indoor locations; however, his sources do not appear to support his assertion. I found it troubling that Dr. Poulin stated during cross-examination that it is not important for scholars to present information that contradicts their own findings (or findings which they support).
[358] The applicants' witnesses are not immune to criticism. The respondent asks this court to assign little weight to Dr. Lowman's opinion. The respondent called Dr. Melchers, a research methodologist, to provide an opinion on Dr. Lowman's three major prostitution-related studies.
Dr. Melchers was highly critical of Dr. Lowman's empirical observations, largely based on the language of causality used in his affidavit. During cross-examination, Dr. Lowman expressed discontent with portions of his affidavit, citing "careless" language and "poorly reasoned argument." Dr. Lowman rightly takes responsibility for the content of his affidavit, which was drafted for him by law students. In his affidavit, Dr. Lowman made a direct causal link between the Criminal Code provisions at issue and violence against prostitutes; however, during cross-examination he gave the opinion that there was, rather, an indirect causal relationship. Such inattentiveness on such a crucial issue is indeed concerning. During cross-examination, Dr.
Lowman gave nuanced and qualified opinions, which more accurately reflect his research.
And in case anyone wanted to know the specific decisions but wasn't quite interested in reading through the details of the decision, here are her general conclusions:
Conclusion: The Applicants Have Been Deprived of Security of the Person by the Impugned Provisions
[359] Despite the multiple problems with the expert evidence, I find that there is sufficient evidence from other experts and government reports to conclude that the applicants have proven on a balance of probabilities, that the impugned provisions sufficiently contribute to a deprivation of their security of the person.
[360] I accept that there are ways of conducting prostitution that may reduce the risk of violence towards prostitutes, and that the impugned provisions make many of these "safety enhancing" methods or techniques illegal. The two factors that appear to impact the level of violence against prostitutes are the location or venue in which the prostitution occurs and individual working conditions of the prostitute.
[361] With respect to s. 210, the evidence suggests that working in-call is the safest way to sell sex; yet, prostitutes who attempt to increase their level of safety by working in-call face criminal sanction. With respect to s. 212(1)(

, prostitution, including legal out-call work, may be made less dangerous if a prostitute is allowed to hire an assistant or a bodyguard; yet, such business relationships are illegal due to the living on the avails of prostitution provision. Finally, s.213(l)(c) prohibits street prostitutes, who are largely the most vulnerable prostitutes and face an alarming amount of violence, from screening clients at an early, and crucial stage of a potential transaction, thereby putting them at an increased risk of violence.
[362] In conclusion, these three provisions prevent prostitutes from taking precautions, some extremely rudimentary, that can decrease the risk of violence towards them. Prostitutes are faced with deciding between their liberty and their security of the person. Thus, while it is ultimately
the client who inflicts violence upon a prostitute, in my view the law plays a sufficient contributory role in preventing a prostitute from taking steps that could reduce the risk of such violence.
She then goes on to rule on issues of arbitrariness, overbreadth, gross disproportionality, the rule of law and concludes that the violations of the applicants' Charter rights cannot be saved by s.1:
[441] In the case at bar, where I have found all the impugned provisions to be grossly disproportionate, and some to be arbitrary and overbroad, it is not possible to say that the provisions are proportionate or minimally impair the applicants' rights to liberty and security of the person. I, therefore, find that none of the impugned provisions are saved by s. 1.
And regarding s. 2(b) Freedom of Expression, it was not disputed that s.2(b) was infringed; the issues was whether or not the infringement was justifiable (saved by s.1):
[503] At this stage, I must weigh the pressing and substantial purpose of controlling the social nuisance associated with prostitution and the minimal salutary effects I have identified against the deleterious effects on the right of prostitutes to express themselves in an effort to protect their
personal safety. As I concluded earlier, this sort of communication is at the very core of the Charter guarantee.
[504] In my view, in pursuing its legislative objective, the communicating provision so severely trenches upon the rights of prostitutes that its pressing and substantial purpose is outweighed by the resulting infringement of rights. This rights infringement is even more severe given the evidence demonstrating the law's general ineffectiveness in achieving its purpose. By increasing the risk of harm to street prostitutes, the communicating law is simply too high a price to pay for the alleviation of social nuisance.
[505] The communicating provision, therefore, fails to meet the proportionality test in Oakes, supra. I find that s. 213(1)(c) represents an unjustifiable limit on the right to freedom of expression.
Justice Himmel also responds to the claim that decriminalizing will create a legal "vacuum" to deal with exploitation and violence by listing numerous sections of the Criminal Code which could and should be applied in the event of victimization. These are listed on pp. 127-130.