The European Union's Other Periphery
Sun, 07/28/2019 - 23:00
Authored by Frank Lee via Off-Guradian.org,
We’ll start with the 10 per-capita poorest-countries in the whole of Europe. In rank order:
Moldova – US$2560
Ukraine – US$3560
Kosovo – US$3990
Albania – US$4450
Bosnia and Herzegovina – US$4769
Republic of Macedonia – US$5150
Serbia – US$5820
Montenegro – US$7320
Bulgaria – US$7620
Romania – US$9420
Average per capita income in Europe as a whole is US$37,317 (2018 figures).
What is noticeable is that most of these states are situated in either the Balkans or South-Eastern Europe. But that is not the end of the story.
Portugal, the poorest country in western Europe with GDP standing at US$238billion, is just pipped by the Czech Republic (now Czechia which is actually in the centre of Europe) as the star performer of the East whose national income stands at US$240.1 billion.
Thus, in terms of per capita income the Czech Republic is the sole representative of the ex-Soviet states in Europe. This geopolitical and economic cleavage could hardly be starker. These two Euro-zones replicate the division of North and South between the US/Canada and central and Latin America.
Much of the attention to European development – or the lack of it – has been preoccupied with the gap between the West and South of Europe. This present schism is attributable to tried, tested, and failed economic strategies promulgated by the various institutions of globalization: the International Monitary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), World Trade Organization (WTO), and so forth.
The single currency, the euro, became legal tender on 1 January 1999 and was adopted by most of the countries in the Euro area. But this proved to be the undoing of the political economy of the South.
When different sovereign states are responsible for their own economic policies and are able to print and issue their own currencies on world markets, any distortions and maladjustments which occur in trade balances is alleviated by changes in exchange rate values – in short, devaluation. This will hopefully restore such imbalances and return to a trade equilibrium.
However, this policy is, now, no longer available to the Southern European states since they no longer have their own currencies and, in addition, are under the tutelage the European Central Bank (ECB). The Southern periphery are now are using the same currency as the Northern European bloc, the euro, and required by the ECB to take on a one-size fits all monetary policy.
Devaluations are therefore ruled out.
Given the higher productivity levels and lower costs of Germany, Holland, Sweden, France and so forth, the Southern peripheral states have begun to run chronic balance of payments deficits. The only avenue left open to them is what is termed ‘internal devaluation’ – i.e., austerity.
This results in low growth, high unemployment, high migration, depopulation, cuts in public spending and the rest of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Policies – policies which have failed just about everywhere. So much for the southern periphery.
Focus on Eastern Europe sheds light on a different set of problems. Most Eastern European countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland kept their own currencies; apart that is from basket cases like Latvia whose government, unlike the people, went where angels feared to tread – into the Eurozone and the euro.
(N.B. Some Western European countries, e.g., the UK, Denmark, Switzerland and Norway did – wisely – keep their own currencies.)
Excluding Russia, of course, these Eastern European states – termed ‘transitional economies’ – have become stalled in economic stagnation which so far has been difficult if not impossible to overcome. These obstacles have been specific to the Eastern periphery.
The European Union now consists of 28 states. No fewer than 10 of these are former states of the Eastern Bloc, and this proportion is set to grow with the impending accession with some minor Balkan nations. Although Georgia and Ukraine are in line for membership of the EU, they are also expected to join NATO as has become customary for aspirant EU states.
Whether they obtain either is a matter of conjecture, however, as this would be almost certain to cross Russia’s red lines and result in a major geopolitical flareup. Europe’s centre of gravity is shifting. And while the process of joining the European Union is driving change within these countries, it is also changing the nature of Europe itself.
WHERE’S MY PORSCHE?
Those Eastern European states which emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union had been led to believe that a bright new world of West European living standards, enhanced pay levels, high rates of social mobility and consumption were on offer.
Unfortunately, they were sold an illusion: the result of the transition so far seems to have been the creation of a low-wage hinterland, a border economy on the fringes of the highly developed European core; a Euro version of NAFTA and the maquiladora, i.e., low tech, low wage, low skills production units on the Mexican side of the US’s southern borders.
This has had wider political and social ramifications for the entire European project. The Brave New World envisaged did not have any basic guiding principles or planning other than the usual neoliberal prescriptions of privatisation-deregulation-liberalisation, the well-thumbed policy triad of the neoliberal playbook.
Central to this policy implementation was a controversial prescription called ‘shock-therapy’. The fact that this policy had already been tried in Russia and failed spectacularly, didn’t seem to worry the powers-that-be. Such is always the case with religious beliefs.
The doctrine itself had become popular among the ingenues and opportunists of the old ‘workers states’. Shock-therapy was designed to wipe-away all the old fuddy-duddy notions about state interventionism, welfarism, social and national protection; measures included the sudden removal of subsidies, fire sales of state assets (privatisation), and the abrupt removal of the controls and subsidies that had formerly applied to wages and prices.
But the neoliberal militants insisted upon a policy of ‘freeing up’ the markets which, according to them, would maximise growth and development. Predictably of course, these policies also opened these countries to maximum – and often predatory – western penetration and influence.
The shock was timed to occur before the establishment of financial markets within the region and, in the absence of investment capital, restructuring efforts became focused on labour – on reducing the unit cost of labour in order to become “competitive”. It should be understood that in neo-liberal, supply-side, economics the road to wealth and prosperity entailed policies that actually make their populations poorer. There seems to be a slightly Orwellian flavour here. ‘Poverty is Wealth.’
The wave of mass unemployment that this generated in the early 1990s goes well beyond the experiences of British recessions of the 1980s, with unemployment in some regions reaching 80 per cent. Shock therapy deliberately engineered a slump in the economies of the region, by shattering the region’s economic links, and then creating a massive domestic recession.
SHOCK-THERAPY – ALL SHOCK NO THERAPY
Regardless, the show must go on. The neoliberal religion taken up in many of these states, often by former members of the Communist nomenklatura, which resulted in high levels of structural unemployment were actually meant to do that, at least in the short-term. Painful as it was bound to be, this was the necessary shakeout of an inefficient and cosseted workforce and therefore the absolute precondition which would catapult these formerly backward economies into lean and mean competitors on Europe’s markets and the prelude of an entry into the developed economies on the Western European and US model. Yeah, right.
In the real-world Michael Hudson analysed just how this process panned out in Latvia.
Like other post-Soviet economies, Latvians wanted to achieve the prosperity they saw in Western Europe. If Latvia had followed the policies that built up the industrial nations, the state would have taxed wealth and income progressively to invest in public infrastructure.
Instead, Latvia’s Baltic miracle assumed largely predatory forms of rent-seeking and insider privatisation. Accepting the US and Swedish advice to accept the world’s most lopsided set of neoliberal tax and financial policies. Latvia levied the heaviest taxes on labour. Employers had to pay a 25% tax on wages plus a 24% of social service tax, whilst wage-earners pay another 11% tax. These three taxes making up to a 60% flat tax before personal deductions.
Additionally, in order to make labour high-cost and uncompetitive, consumers must pay a high value-added sales tax of 21% (raised sharply from 7%) after the 2008 blowout. No Western economy taxes wages and consumption at that level.
Latvia’s heavy taxation of labour finds its counterpart in a mere 10% on dividends, interest and other returns to wealth and the lowest property tax rate of any other economy. Thus, Latvian fiscal policy retarded growth and employment whilst concurrently subsidising a real estate bubble that is the chief feature of Latvia’s “Baltic Miracle”.
Now Latvia was to open up its economy to foreign capital inflows – hot money – from foreign bank affiliates, mainly Scandinavian, whose chief interest was to finance the property boom. Of course, these cash inflows needed to be serviced and in doing so became a financial tax on the nation’s labour and industry. Other sources in overseas monies came in the form of privatisation of Latvia’s public sector stock. Sweden became a major source of these rent-seeking inflows.
Yet with all of this money flowing into Latvia absolutely no effort was made to restructure industry and agriculture to generate foreign exchange to import capital and consumer goods not produced at home. Having lost export potentialities during the COMECON period the existing production linkages were uprooted, industrial plants were dismantled for their land value scrapped or transformed into real estate gentrification.
The Baltic miracle had been nothing more than a property debt-bubble financed by foreign capital inflows. When the flows reversed the extent of debt deflation, deindustrialisation and depopulation (see below) became apparent.
The Austerity programme … Latvia was suffering was the world’s steepest one-year plunge in house prices which had peaked in 2007. Despite having emerged debt-free in 1991, Latvia had become Europe’s most debt-strapped country, without using some of its borrowed credit to modernize its industry or agriculture.”
What was true of Latvia was also generally the case in the rest of Eastern Europe’ Thus by 2008 it had become apparent that the post-Soviet economies had not really grown as much as they had been financialized and indebted.
Forbes economist Adomanis calculated in 2014 that convergence of these economies with those of the West…
…continues at its 2008-13 pace (about 0.37% per annum) it would take the new EU members over 100 years to match up to the core countries average level of income …to the extent that Central Europe’s most rapid and sustained burst of convergence coincided with a credit bubble that is highly unlikely to be repeated, it seems more likely than not that the regions convergence will be slower in the future than it was in the past.”
BUDDY CAN YOU SPARE A EURO
With the decimation of indigenous industry, the role of financialization and debt became crucial, as the new capitalist economies required a financial services industry that could support the growing tendencies towards property speculation and asset manipulation.
Different vulnerabilities arose from the actions of different institutions, but the overall effect was to create state dependency upon foreign direct investment (FDI), and support from the World Bank, IMF and the specially created European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
The general financialization of the region led to huge increases in debt, both personal and institutional. Western banks in a number of smaller states, most notably Austria and Sweden, sought to boost their profits through increasing their market share in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region, by aggressive lending to households.
Drawing on the general expectation of CEE countries’ membership of the EU to borrow on the wholesale money markets and taking advantage of financial deregulation and poor consumer protection standards in the region, they lent money denominated in Euros, Swiss Francs and Japanese Yen. This allowed them to offer consumers lower interest rates than those available for borrowing in domestic currencies. And this borrowing has driven eye-watering increases in levels of personal household debt – especially in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic States.
Another consequence of shock-therapy was the pressure that it would generate on the European Union to open up western European markets to the Central and Eastern Europe countries. The model that peripheral states adopted – of being low-wage export-based economies – depended on access to EU markets.
However, in order to sell on EU markets, it is necessary to have something to export. But these states simply did not and do not have the industrial and/or financial capacity to compete with Western European states and are not likely to have in the foreseeable future. Being subordinated to a set of rules empowered by global institutions, the IMF, WB, WTO – neoliberalism – makes such development impossible.
Of course, there has been some Western investment in Central and Eastern Europe but without wishing to be cynical – moi? Never! – not all of this investment has been for Central and Eastern Europe's benefit, most of it was purely predatory.
For example, the US Transnational Conglomerate, General Electric, after sniffing out worthwhile opportunities for a quick buck decided upon buying a lighting company, Tungsram, in Hungary. They swiftly closed profitable product lines and were thus able to remove a source of domestic competition from the market.
Similarly, the Hungarian cement industry was bought by foreign owners, who then prevented their Hungarian affiliates from exporting; and an Austrian steel producer bought a major Hungarian steel plant only in order to close it down and capture its ex-Soviet market for the Austrian parent company. For a voracious appetite try Volkswagen.
VW acquired a controlling stake in SEAT in 1986, making it the first non-German marque of the company, and acquired control of Škoda (see below) in 1994, of Bentley, Lamborghini and Bugatti in 1998, Scania in 2008 and of Ducati, MAN and Porsche in 2012.
But VW’s cherry-picking didn’t stop there.
Case Study: VWs takeover of Skoda
Five months after the fall of Communism and before of any kind shock-therapy had been launched Citreon, GM, Renault, and Volvo were clamouring for Skoda. VW won the bid promising DM7.1 billion, promising to raise production to 450,000 cars per year by 2000. Engine parts were to be manufactured in Bohemia and a promise was made to use Czech suppliers. The Czech workforce was to be retained. The Czech government was favourably disposed to this sort of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and gave VW a protected position in the home market in addition to a two-year tax holiday writing off Skoda’s debts.
Things turned sour, however, when VW reneged on its debts and promises. The original investment of Deutschmark(DM)7.1 billion was reduced to DM3.8 billion, there would be no Czech engine plant, and no commitment to produce 405,000 cars by year 2000. The labour force would be cut to 15,000 followed by more redundancies, and VW would increasingly to German parts suppliers rather than Czech subsidiaries, bringing in 15 such firms to replace their Czech competitors.
These are examples of the ways in which the “peripheral economy” status of the CEE region was imposed. An exploitative relationship between East and West. The Skoda experience of the negative outcome from opening up of the leading sectors of a target’s country’s (the Czech Republic) production apparatus into the global strategy of a Western TNC is not unique and is a common feature of foreign direct investment flows.
After only a couple of years of “shock-therapy”, much of the core industrial infrastructure of the peripheral states had fallen into the hands of multinational companies – from chains of shops, to power generating plant and steelworks. Two political/social phenomena resulted from the asset-stripping (whoops, I mean productive investment).
POLITICAL
Since the advent of the shock therapy, it would have been expected that East European voters would have voted en masse for parties of the left for the usual reasons. Namely to mitigate the worst social and economic effects of the capitalist transition.
But these parties themselves had become Blairised, i.e., heavily committed to the pseudo-reformist ‘third-way’ along with the orthodoxies of neoliberal economics, as this was seen as part of their commitment to European accession. Into the ideological vacuum and emerging across the region came populist and right-wing movements, in Poland and Hungary in particular as well the semi-fascist Baltics where they have always had a presence.
These groups have attempted to harness people’s discontent. Political forces that flourished in the time of the Austro-Hungarian empire have re-emerged – such as anti-Semitic “Christian socialism” and patriotic “national liberalism”. and perhaps more important came mass migration and depopulation in the whole area…
Full article:
https://nationandstate.com/2019/07/29/the-eus-other-periphery/